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I have attached for your clearance a copy of the Secretary's draft INF testimony for his appearance before the SFRC on March 14. Please have comments/clearance to me no later than COB Wednesday, March 9. 67-2097

Attachment: Shultz Testimony

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TESTIMONY BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
MARCH 14, 1988
IN SUPPORT OF THE INF TREATY

Mr. Chairman:

It has been seven weeks since I first spoke to you on behalf of the INF Treaty. Since then, that Treaty has received careful and complete examination by the Senate. This committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Select Committee on Intelligence have held a series of hearings. I

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have followed these hearings carefully and would like to congratulate the Senate on its thoroughness and the sense of high responsibility with which it has approached this task.

For our part, the Administration is providing official answers to over a thousand questions submitted by the Senate. These written answers, together with the testimony of Administration officials, constitute our authoritative interpretation of the INF Treaty. In addition, we have taken the unusual step of providing to the Senate the Treaty negotiating record.

This Committee is now preparing to consider all the relevant material in its entirety and forward a recommendation to the full Senate. I therefore welcome the opportunity to sum up why I believe you should recommend advice and consent to this Treaty as it stands, without amendments or conditions.

As the recent NATO Summit declaration notes, "we seek negotiations not for their own sake but to reach agreements which can significantly reduce the risk of conflict and make a genuine contribution to stability and peace." The INF Treaty does just that. It also achieves the specific goals established by the Alliance more than eight years ago in the dual-track decision. It removes the SS-20 threat. By

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eliminating substantially more Soviet weapons than American ones in order to reach an equal outcome, it reaffirms the principle of equality. It is global in application and excludes third country systems. It does not weaken NATO's conventional forces and places concurrent and equal constraints on U.S. and Soviet shorter-range INF missiles. It sets new standards for verification. In short, as NATO leaders unanimously reaffirmed in their discussions with the President at the March 2-3 Summit in Brussels, the Treaty "is a milestone in our efforts to achieve a more secure peace and lower levels of arms."

Our allies have spoken out strongly in favor of the Treaty. Many of you have heard this overwhelming support firsthand, not only from visiting dignitaries, but also as members of Congressional delegations to Europe. In particular, I would like to applaud the trip last month by the Majority Leader and his bipartisan delegation and the important report which it produced.

As you know from those meetings and from the results of the NATO Summit, attention is now focused on how to consolidate and build on the success in INF. The Alliance has not fallen into a state of unthinking euphoria. It is facing the challenges of the future soberly, with unity and firmness. We have an agenda

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and we are pursuing it steadfastly.

Deterrence and Collective Security

Much of what I say today will sound familiar. That is because this Treaty is an integral part of our long-standing approach to safeguarding our security and that of our allies. The most fundamental way in which this Treaty strengthens our security is by strengthening NATO. Of course, our friends and allies in Asia and the Pacific also directly benefit from this Treaty, and we have consulted closely with them too. But above all, INF represents a Soviet challenge that NATO successfully met.

NATO is far more than a military alliance. But first and foremost its mission is to maintain the military strength to preserve deterrence and thus prevent war, nuclear or conventional. The INF Treaty serves this mission by eliminating a real threat to the Alliance -- a threat which has both political and military dimensions. It eliminates the military threat posed by an increasing SS-20 force at a time when the Soviet Union has strategic parity with the United States. In addition, it will improve NATO's conventional situation by eliminating conventional- and chemical-capable systems able to hold at risk NATO airbases, ports, depots, and

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other facilities.

The INF Treaty will not weaken NATO's ability to continue to carry out its strategy of flexible response. Flexible response clearly does not depend, and never has depended, on any single weapon system. The three legs of the NATO Triad -- U.S. strategic forces, nuclear weapons based in Europe, and conventional forces -- will continue to make the Soviets understand that any conceivable gain from armed attack on a NATO ally cannot outweigh the risks of failure and of danger to the Soviet Union itself.

The INF Treaty also strengthens NATO politically, vindicating our policies of strength and unity. It is an Alliance success because NATO has made clear to the Soviets that it treats the security of each of its members with equal importance, and has firmly rejected the Soviet concept that only the superpowers have a right to genuine security. The INF experience shows that tough-mindedness, clarity of purpose, and resolve pay off, and offers important lessons on how to proceed as we confront other challenges to our security.

Role of Arms Control in Security Policy

Maintaining strong alliances and an effective deterrent is

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the key to a successful national security policy. At the same time, the U.S. has also sought to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons. As with the other elements of our security policy, this has been a bipartisan objective, carried out by Presidents, and supported by Senators and members of Congress, of both parties.

Our NATO allies fully support this approach as well. In meeting the Soviet challenge, the Alliance has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the twin pillars of defense and dialogue. We and our allies see arms control as a means of strengthening both pillars. Sound and verifiable arms control agreements can be used to stabilize the military balance at lower levels of forces, and in so doing they can enhance mutual confidence and expand areas of understanding.

Arms control is not an end in itself, however. It is a means to enhance our security. It will do so only if we set the following standards -- and live up to them:

- o We must clearly establish objectives that support our security. Arms control policy is not a substitute for security policy;
- o We must take the necessary military measures to preserve

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our own security -- only if we are strong and determined will the Soviets negotiate; and

o We must keep the courage of our convictions at the bargaining table, and persist until our objectives are achieved.

That is exactly what we have done in INF. It is by no means a U.S. achievement alone: full credit must go to our Allies, especially the five INF basing countries. Our allies and friends in the Far East were also strongly supportive. The Treaty is not an achievement of this Administration alone: NATO took the INF dual-track decision under the previous administration. Nor is it an achievement for the Executive Branch alone: Congress has been fully supportive of our efforts, both in deployments and in the negotiations -- including through the Congressional Observers Group. As I mentioned during my last appearance before this Committee, the Senate unanimously endorsed the "zero option" when the President first proposed it, in November 1981.

The Example of INF

Let me briefly state how we met the three standards I have just outlined:

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-- First, we clearly established our objectives. NATO's objective, as is stated in the 1979 dual-track decision, was to deal with the growing disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in INF missiles. The Treaty not only eliminates the disparity, it eliminates that threat completely.

The INF Treaty stands on its own merits. We rejected Soviet efforts to hold it hostage to other areas of arms control. Clearly, its benefits will be enhanced if and when we conclude a START Treaty, eliminate chemical weapons on a global basis, and establish a conventional balance in Europe at lower levels. Those are our priorities in arms control and we are pressing ahead to achieve them. But this is a good Treaty that can stand alone and by itself measure up to this standard.

No single treaty can solve all our problems and we have never thought that it could. During the 1970s we were perfectly willing to negotiate on conventional, chemical, and strategic weapons without reference to the INF situation, and we should not hold INF hostage to those other areas now.

-- Second, we took the steps necessary for our own security. The deployment track of NATO's 1979 decision was absolutely essential for success in the negotiations. This

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underscores a point which the President has often emphasized and that applies across the board in dealing with the Soviets. We will never succeed in getting them to negotiate seriously about our concerns unless there is a tangible incentive for them to do so. NATO's deployment program -- and the willingness of our allies to stand by it in the face of tremendous political pressure -- provided just that incentive. It would be a real mistake -- both for this Treaty and for the prospects for a START Treaty -- to do anything that reduces those incentives. Any sort of "understanding" on mutual restraint for systems not part of the Treaty will only hobble us and leave the Soviets free to do as they will. We should accept nothing short of a binding and verifiable START Treaty. This leads me to my next point.

-- We persisted until our objectives were achieved. You are by now familiar with the specific criteria we established for the negotiations:

-- Equality of rights and limits.

-- U.S. and Soviet systems only.

-- Global limits, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, or vice versa.

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:
-- No adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability; and

-- Effective verification.

When the negotiations began, in 1981, the Soviet position failed all five of these security criteria. It took six years of hard bargaining, including a Soviet walkout that lasted over a year, but the INF Treaty meets all five criteria and more.

Security Benefits of INF Treaty

You have already heard from our top military authorities of the security benefits of this Treaty. Secretary Carlucci, Admiral Crowe and the other Chiefs, and General Galvin have spoken eloquently to this point. I will simply remind you that the Defense Ministers of the NATO Alliance have all fully endorsed this Treaty and urged its early entry into force.

There are also direct political benefits to NATO:

- o We have made clear to the Soviet Union that the

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Alliance can and will take the steps necessary to see to its security. We showed that we cannot be intimidated, either by SS-20 deployments or political pressure.

- o We have demonstrated that the unilateral disarmers are wrong. Peace through strength is the policy that gets results.

- o We have shown that there are no special zones of security within NATO, and that a threat to one or some members of the Alliance is treated as a threat to us all. And I should add, we have shown our German Allies that we are alert to their interests and concerns.

Finally, there are the precedents we have set for future arms control agreements, which will help to ensure that they too will enhance our security:

- o The Treaty reaffirms the principle of equality. There can be no other basis for U.S./Soviet arms control.

- o Because the Soviets had deployed more, the Treaty

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also sets an example for asymmetrical reductions.

o It keeps third-country systems and programs of cooperation with our allies completely out. That's exactly where they will stay as we proceed with our arms control agenda. The Soviets may be less inclined to waste time and effort on these subjects in the future due to the firm stand we took in INF.

o We excluded from this Treaty any language that the Soviets could twist to argue against steps we and our allies decide to take to maintain a strong deterrent. I think your careful study of Article XIV shows how well we did in this regard. There can be no doubt on this point. Even Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told the Supreme Soviet last month that "the Treaty itself does not give . . . a guarantee" against NATO force modernization.

o The Treaty does not rely on Soviet goodwill, but rather requires a comprehensive and unprecedented verification regime, including on-site inspections.

Verification

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The structure of the verification regime has deliberate redundancies. This sort of double-checking is what gives it its power. One layer of the regime builds on another, to provide a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Of course, the "zero option" makes verification easier and more certain. Permitting conventionally-armed missiles while banning such nuclear-armed missiles would have created enormous verification problems. Moreover, the U.S. military had no plans to deploy conventional intermediate- or shorter-range systems, whether ballistic or cruise missiles. Allowing Soviet deployment of conventional GLCMs could have exacerbated the existing conventional imbalance (and added to Soviet chemical capabilities,) especially given the possibility that the Soviets could have deployed these systems in far greater numbers than NATO. So conventional GLCMs or ballistic missiles in the INF range band are banned. Of course, this situation is different from that in START, where the U.S. must protect its substantial force of conventionally-armed sea-launched cruise missiles as well as prospects for a conventionally-armed air-launched cruise missile.

With zero, once the elimination period is over, the existence of any intermediate- or shorter-range missile would be a violation. That is why, for this Treaty, we decided

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"anywhere, anytime" verification was not essential, particularly when weighed against the consequences of possible compromise of sensitive U.S. and Allied facilities. For this reason, while INF will provide some useful precedents for START, a START verification regime will necessarily be more complex, as it will permit continued deployments and production. At the same time, there is no need to reopen the negotiations to apply provisions of a START regime retroactively to INF -- the INF verification regime is effective as it stands for the specific needs of INF verification.

Of course, no regime can provide one hundred percent certainty. But the INF Treaty does not permit the Soviets to maintain essential infrastructure or to conduct flight tests essential to maintain a militarily significant force. Both flight testing and infrastructure can be detected by national technical means. Without those capabilities, even if the Soviets were to hoard some systems, they would in time atrophy. And, of course, unseen INF systems are useless for purposes of political intimidation.

Compliance

I discussed the question of compliance in detail when I was

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here last and outlined the improved procedures for the resolution of disputes contained in the INF Treaty. I just want to emphasize today that, if we ever were to determine that the Soviets were not complying with this agreement, this President, or any future President, would rely on the Senate's support to deal with that fact.

We as a country can safeguard our security only if we are willing to do what is needed to maintain and enhance our strength. If the Soviets cheat on this Treaty, the President will count on Congress to help him take the measures necessary to preserve our security, and that of our allies.

For that is one of the key lessons of INF. If we have the willpower and the strength to see to our own security, we will succeed. If we do not, we have no one to blame but ourselves when we fail. It is within our hands to decide.

Conclusions

Mr. Chairman, I believe my remarks have addressed the major elements of the INF Treaty which have been identified by some Senators. I hope, as you assess all the arguments, that you and your colleagues will reach the same conclusion I have: that the INF Treaty is sound, effective and verifiable just as

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it is, and very much in the security interests of the United States and its Allies. For our part, the Administration sees no need whatsoever for Senate reservations, amendments or understandings or to postpone its implementation pending solutions to unrelated problems.

We have an ambitious agenda with the Soviet Union. That agenda was recently endorsed at the NATO Summit. I have outlined the arms control priorities we have agreed on with our allies. The President's top priority is a START treaty, reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic forces by fifty per cent in a way that is structured to enhance stability. As in INF, the President's initial concept is turning out to be the basis on which the Soviets are now negotiating.

Arms control is not a favor we are doing the Soviet Union; it is a way of seeing to our own security, and that of our allies. And we will not allow arms control to dominate the East/West relationship. We have a broad agenda in which we address human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral issues as well.

The President's approach of realism, strength, and dialogue is paying off. The Treaty you have before you for consideration is tangible evidence of the success of our

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approach. It is an accomplishment that the United States has achieved in partnership with its friends and allies, and that the Administration has achieved in partnership with the Congress. The more closely you study it, the more I am sure you will agree that it deserves your full support.

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